Authors and University	Paper Abstracts
Vinay Kumar and Sophia Tan **Nanyang Technological University, Singapore**	**The Need for Philosophy for Faculty Development in Higher Education** We work in an educational development unit at a centre for teaching and learning in a public, research-intensive university in the Asia-Pacific region. Per our own formulation, our work involves strategic planning, cultural change, pedagogic training, and other faculty development initiatives that aim to transform and enhance the quality of higher education provided at the institution. One key domain of activity that has gained traction in universities around the world—at least partly due perhaps to the growing number of education-focused academic career tracks –is the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning (SoTL). SoTL is generally construed as a form of systematic inquiry into teaching and learning with aim of improving pedagogic practice and, ultimately, student learning. In this paper, using SoTL as empirical grounding, we seek to illustrate the need for the philosophy of social science (PoSS) for faculty development in a higher education setting. The gist of our proposal is that faculty who engage in FD initiatives, including SoTL, tend to come from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds and perhaps as a consequence, tend to bring their own disciplinary perspectives to the SoTL table. As such, they tend to implicitly carry philosophical assumptions and commitments about the nature of systematic social inquiry---knowingly or unknowingly they take sides on philosophical positions. What PoSS offers here is a form of critical reflexivity--that is, the possibility of bringing these issues to the surface and to make them explicit, such that faculty can become aware of them, deeply reflect upon them, and take a reasoned position on them while acknowledging the implications and limitations of doing so. Drawing on insights from education (Shulman), philosophy of social science (Abend), and from combinations of the two (Biesta), we proceed by discussing (a non-exhaustive but hopefully illustrative list of) three problems: (1) the assumption of the centrality of learning and the need for a more critical consideration of the ontology of learning as an object of inquiry. (2) the assumption that the aims of SoTL are not to contribute to educational theory and thus is to be distinguished from education research. Further discussion is needed here of what it means to contribute (and not contribute) to educational theory. And if not, what is the point? (3) The idea that SoTL provides evidence for practice. Here as well, more epistemic discussion is needed on what evidence means (and what it ought to mean) in education research. Building on these three examples, we conclude with a call for further integration and engagement with PoSS and SoTL as a form of faculty development in higher education. Crucially, given the diverse disciplinary backgrounds of faculty who

	participate in SoTL, adding PoSS to SoTL can help educators hone a sharpened capacity to design, evaluate, and contribute to SoTL projects and to discern their insights and implications for educational practice, if any. What PoSS will bring to the SoTL table includes a critical reflectivity, an awareness of ontological and epistemological commitments and judgments, and the implications of disciplinary and methodological pluralism. These qualities may allow faculty development initiatives—including SoTL, effectively a form of 'applied' social science research—to depart from mechanical approaches to 'improving student learning' to a more critical, reflexive, inquiry-based practice. This could imply moving beyond tips, tricks, and techniques to a deeper engagement with the philosophical aspects of higher education itself. That said, even if our proposal is agreeable, practical challenges lie ahead.
Wei Fang **Sun Yat-sen** **University,** **China**	**Proportionality and Nonreductive Explanations in the Social Sciences** Building upon the notion of proportionality, this article proposes a line of argument in favor of nonreductive explanations in the social sciences. I argue that many higher-level explanations in the social sciences, i.e., explanations over and above the individual-level, are legitimate explanations insofar as their explanantia are proportional to their given explananda of interest. These higher-level explanations are often favored over their individual-level reductive counterparts because they are strictly more informative than their reductive counterparts. This line of argument has been extensively discussed in the general philosophy of science, yet it has received little attention from philosophers of the social sciences. According to this line of argument, with respect to the same relatively higher-level explanandum of interest, a relatively higher-level causal explanation that invokes a higher-level factor (or structure, constraint, etc.) as the explanans might fare much better than a lower-level causal explanation that invokes the individuals and their interactions as the explanans. The former is called a proportional causal explanation, while the latter is called a disproportional one. The proportional explanation fares much better because it contains strictly much more information than any of its lower-level, disproportional counterparts. Or, to put it differently, the proportional explanation entails the lower-level, disproportional one but not vice versa. So, if informativeness is an epistemic virtue to be respected in scientific practice, we obtain a good reason to favor nonreductive explanations in the social sciences invoking higher-level factors (or structures, constraints) as their explanans. The notion of proportionality, as a first approximation, is understood roughly as this: a proportional causal explanation is one that contains neither too much nor too little information with respect to explaining the given explanandum of interest (Woodward 2010, 2021; Griffiths et al. 2015; Pocheville et al. 2017; Bourrat 2018). That is, it is not the case that the explanans contains too much irrelevant

	information such that it makes the explanation clumsy, nor is it the case that the explanans omits too much relevant information such that it makes the explanation ineffective. Proportionality often comes down to the problem of variable (or model) selection, where the relevant question is what level of description concerning the explanans best suits the given explanandum. It is argued that the selected variable denoting the explanans should strike the right balance between not-too-general and not-too-specific, i.e., should be proportional with respect to the given explanandum. A case is discussed to show how this line of argument applies to the social sciences. Consider how tertiary education affects employment. I argue that the causal explanation "a higher tertiary education rate leads to a higher employment rate" is a fully legitimate causal explanation given that the explanans of this explanation, i.e., a higher tertiary education rate, is proportional to the given explanandum, i.e., a higher employment rate. By contrast, any individual-level explanation invoking any particular configuration of those individuals who either have received tertiary education or not is a disproportional explanation and thus less informative than the proportional one. In other words, all these individual-level explanations can be entailed by the proportional explanation, but not vice versa.
Abhinav Kumar Jawaharlal Nehru University, India	**From Individual to Social: Understanding Ontological Individualism** Ever since Steven Lukes pointed out that methodological individualism is, in fact, a combination of two theses, one is an ontological claim and another explanatory claim, the thesis of ontological individualism is taken as trivially true and universally acceptable. There has been a unanimous belief among philosophers to accept that, ontologically speaking, there is nothing above and beyond to society than the individuals and the relations between them. Ontological individualism captures a strong intuition about how individuals are metaphysical building blocks of society. This raises three questions that need to be unpacked. First, how exactly do we understand the dependence of 'social' on the 'individual'? Second, how do we define what we mean by individual (and individualistic facts, properties, and so on)? And third, how do we explain what we mean by social (and social facts, properties)? While understanding these three questions, two major problems arise. One is the idea that society depends on many non-individualistic, material factors, so ontological individualism cannot be successful social ontology, and the second is the notion that individuals, in a metaphysical sense, are constructed by society. The paper engages with some of the recent works by Brian Epstein and Daniel Little to understand these two criticisms and then think of responses to them. At this point, I also want to bring two essential intuitions regarding this metaphysical claim of individualism. Colin Morris, in his "Discovery of the

	Individual: 1050-1200," observes, "The hard core of this individualism lies in the psychological experience with which we began: the sense of a clear distinction between my being and that of other people." This is similar to Philip Pettit's articulation of "individualism" in his article "Three Issues in Social Ontology ," which he describes as an issue dealing with our status as intentional beings whose psychological sense of self is not undermined by social facts or laws. However, this doesn't mean we need to reduce individualism to psychologism. I believe, based on these two understandings, we can start making sense of the dependency of society on individuals. Broadly speaking, this paper has two chief goals. First, to establish that there is a strong sense in which individuals can be understood as the building blocks of society. And second, to respond to two prominent criticisms of the thesis of ontological individualism i.e. the materialist critique and the social constructivist critique. Regarding the first goal, I argue that we can interpret ontological individualism in a non-reductive way and understand the dependence of society on the individual. And concerning the second goal (the two criticisms), I argue that ontological individualism does not ignore the role of non-individualistic (material) factors in constituting society. Instead, these factors can be accommodated well in the individualistic framework. In a similar vein, ontological individualists do not deny the crucial ways in which individuals depend on other individuals, nor deny the importance of social relations individuals have.
Kanit (Mitinunwong) Sirichan Chulalongkorn University, Thailand	**Social Ontology and Methodological Individualism** Social ontology concerns what exists in the social world, e.g. groups, structure, norms, institutions, and if such social entities exist, then how they exist. Though social entities are assumed in empirical research in the social sciences, a controversy is about their nature, i.e. whether they are ontologically individual or holistic. The issue is closely connected with the debate on methodological individualism (MI) and methodological holism (MH). Natalie Bulle (2023) proposes a non-reductionist form of MI which incorporates MH in the sense of 'holism of the parts'. The social holistic nature is pertained in individuals under the evolutionary constraint of rationality. However, it is questionable whether Bulle's proposal faces the problem of explanatory gap, i.e. the gap between the wholes and the parts. Though, under the creative

	evolution, the new wholes are causally produced by the parts, the wholes do not seem to have causal power over the parts. If Haslanger (2022) is right, MI is not sufficient for understanding how the causal power of the materiality of the social world plays the role in individuals' lives through social practices. Haslanger's project of doing social ontology is an ameliorative one. It means that the criterion of choosing an appropriate account of social ontology is pragmatic aiming at correcting the problematic conceptual framework. My presentation will take such account as an assumption. Though Haslanger criticism is mainly on reductionist form of MI, I will pursue whether Bulle's non-reductionist MI can be evaded from such criticism.
Yafeng Wang Northeastern University, United States	Process Tracing and the Problem of Establishing Causal Relationships Within a Case Process tracing is a research method used in social sciences, particularly in case studies and mixed-methods research. It aims to identify the presence or absence of a hypothesized causal mechanism in a specific case by examining within-case evidence. Practitioners of process tracing break down the hypothesized causal mechanism into parts and look for observable consequences of each part within the case. The way they divide causal mechanisms depends on their conception of these mechanisms. Some adopt a minimalist view, seeing a causal mechanism as a chain of causally connected intervening variables. Others, influenced by Machamer et al.'s analysis of biological mechanisms, view social mechanisms as involving social actors engaging in activities that influence each other. Despite these differences, the core strategy remains the same: unpack the causal mechanism into intermediate stages and look for evidence of each stage and the causal relationships between them. A significant challenge in process tracing is establishing causal relationships within a case. This involves determining what counts as evidence for or against the causal relationships between different intermediate stages of a mechanism. These within-case relationships are token-level causal relationships, and it is unclear what observable consequences of these relationships should be and what kind of within-case observations constitute evidence for or against them. Although some scholars have raised this issue, there are few systematic attempts to address it in the methodology literature. To address this challenge, I introduce the concept of "feature dependence." This concept suggests that the causal factors in token-level causal relationships within

	a case are rich in detail, referred to as "features." For example, the end of the Cold War is a complex event with numerous features, as are the events causally related to it. A token-level causal relationship between two factors, C and E, is typically associated with a set of dependence relationships between features of C and features of E. If there is a causal relationship between C and E, there should be a dependence relationship between at least some feature X of C and some feature Y of E. I formulate feature dependence as two types of conditional statements: 1. Feature Sufficiency: If C was an actual cause of E, then if C had feature X, E would have feature Y. 2. Feature Necessity: If C was an actual cause of E, then if E had feature Y, C would have feature X. These conditionals draw observable consequences from the hypothesized causal relationship, as the features of C and E can be observed within the case. By checking whether the causal factors possess their corresponding features, within-case observations can provide evidence for or against the hypothesized causal relationship. Finally, I analyze a process-tracing study by political scientist Vesla Weaver to illustrate how feature dependence supports causal claims within a hypothesized mechanism in a single case.
Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr. De La Salle University, Philippines	**Environmental Non-anthropocentrism** A key objection to contemporary non-anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics—such as sentientism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism—is their alleged incoherence. Critics argue that while these approaches explicitly reject anthropocentrism, they nonetheless implicitly uphold it. Without endorsing a specific type of environmental ethics, this essay explores a way to resolve this objection. It first distinguishes two forms of anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism based on the agency-patiency dichotomy in moral personhood. It then argues that agent anthropocentrism and patient non-anthropocentrism, given their distinct concerns, can co-exist without contradiction. Specifically, agent anthropocentrism restricts moral agency to humans, while patient non-anthropocentrism expands moral patiency to include both humans and nonhumans. Moreover, a moral framework that extends the Kantian principle of respect for persons to non-humans enables human agents to regard non-human patients simultaneously as means and ends with moral consistency

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Norms and scientific explanations

A key issue in the debate between naturalism and anti-naturalism in the philosophy of social sciences concerns the value-ladenness of the social world, presenting the following dilemma: either the social world is inherently value-laden, entailing a methodological gap between the social and natural sciences, or it is not, allowing for methodological unity. I refer to this as the value-ladenness dilemma. This dichotomy has profoundly shaped philosophical discussions, particularly regarding the concept of value-ladenness and its explanatory role in social phenomena. Anti-naturalist approaches emphasize the intrinsic value-laden nature of the social world, arguing that the social sciences focus on meanings, norms, and intentions and that distinguishes them from the natural sciences (Eriksson, 2016; Okrent, 2016; Peregrin, 2016; Risjord, 2016). In contrast, naturalist perspectives reject this methodological gap, asserting that the social sciences can—and should—conform to the same standards of value-neutrality as the natural sciences (e.g. (Henderson, 2002; Roth, 2016; Turner, 2010). While naturalism and anti-naturalism have varying interpretations, for brevity, this paper uses 'anti-naturalism' (or 'normativism') to denote the stance embracing the first horn of the dilemma: that the value-ladenness of the social world necessitates a methodological gap. Conversely, 'naturalism' (or more accurately, 'eliminative naturalism') refers to the stance embracing the second horn, rejecting this gap and dismissing the normative character of the social world.

This paper aims to dissolve the value-ladenness dilemma by demonstrating that while the social world is indeed value-laden, this does not entail a fundamental methodological gap between the social and natural sciences. Specifically, I argue that methodological unity between the social and natural sciences does not require the social world to be value-free. My strategy for resolving the dilemma involves combining a specific conception of the presuppositions of empirical research with a particular view of values or norms. This combination creates the necessary conceptual space to accommodate the view that the social world is value-laden while simultaneously rejecting the existence of a methodological gap between the social and natural sciences.

The argument proceeds as follows. First, I articulate the dilemma of value-ladenness by contrasting the notions of 'empirical-scientific' and 'normative' explanations, reframing the debate in terms of the eliminability of normative explanations. Next, I examine the presuppositions of empirical research, emphasizing the role of constitutive principles. For the purposes of my argument, I assume the existence of framework-specific principles, which determine the logical relations between predicates or properties within each framework while simultaneously establishing the framework's ontological commitments. Subsequently, I analyze the concept of normative propositions, distinguishing between norms-qua-normative and other categories, such as social norms or

	reports of norms. To achieve this, I employ Anscombe's (2000) notion of direction of fit as the logical basis for a demarcation criterion. Finally, I argue that understanding norms as constitutive principles of empirical research concerning social phenomena allows us to retain the value-ladenness of the social world while rejecting the methodological gap between the social and natural sciences. By treating normative propositions as constitutive principles, we can acknowledge their explanatory indispensability in social science while rejecting the methodological gap between the social and natural sciences.
Clint Edward Hurshman University of Kansas, United States	**Clinical nudging: On the ethics of (ir)rational influence** "Nudges" are features of the ways that choices are presented to agents that influence their disposition to choose a given option, but without giving them a reason to choose that option (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Features such as the order in which options are presented, the language used to describe them, the setting of one option as a "default," and other details of choice situations can all partially determine an agent's choice, even when they do not change the desirability of the options. Nudging, particularly in the context of clinical decision-making, has been criticized on the grounds that it undermines or disrespects autonomy (Hausman and Welch 2010). However, in recent years, philosophers have criticized the concept of nudging itself for being vague. In particular, it is unclear to what extent nudges are really irrational influences on behavior, since some purported examples of nudges in fact seem to give agents reasons to choose one option over another because they can be interpreted as implicit recommendations or endorsements (Levy 2019). This paper explores the implications of this vagueness for the ethics of clinical nudging, and in the process it defends the practice. On one hand, if nudges are understood as irrational influences on behavior, I show that it does not follow that they undermine or disrespect autonomy. Rather, our susceptibility to nudges shows that our autonomy is limited even in the absence of nudges; thus, nothing is gained through designers explicitly putting no thought into the design of choice situations. Grill (2014), for example, points out that agents partly form their preferences in response to choice situations; thus, nudges do not necessarily steer them toward or away from authentic, pre-existing preferences. Given the difficulty agents face in predicting even their own preferences in high-stakes medical decision-making, I show that Grill's argument applies in the clinical context. On the other hand, nudges may be understood as rational influences on behavior insofar as they present to agents as recommendations (Levy 2019). Agents expect (if implicitly) that choice architects include only desirable options and would only set an option as the "default" if it is particularly desirable. Thus, the presentation of the choice situation informs the chooser's understanding of her situation. I

	argue that this effect should be expected in clinical decision-making, where clinicians are experts and choosers can be under intense stress. Clinicians therefore have reason to aim to ensure that implicit recommendations reasonably gleaned from their presentation of options are ones they can endorse. This amounts to the "libertarian paternalism" advocated by pro-nudgers.
Horacio Ortiz **Université Paris** **Dauphine,** **France**	**Conceptualizing monetary relations with Deleuze's notion of multiplicity** A contemporary conceptualization of money, shared by authors in anthropology, sociology, history and institutional economics, is concerned with the idea, already formulated by Simmel, that for money to exist, its users must share some kind of conceptual standard. Going beyond the classical three functions of money, the analysis highlights the role money plays in the constitution of social groups and its intimate relation with political and religious institutions. This conceptualization of money faces a task of accounting together for money's unity and its existence in a multiplicity of practices that give it different, often fleeting meanings and roles. Simmel addressed this tension as a dialectics between the specificity of individual desire, realized in individual practices of money, and the dependence of the individual on the social group that is constituted by using a shared standard. In a different but comparable way, Mauss conceptualized money as grounded in a universal morality of hierarchical reciprocity. For many authors, analyzing the tension between money's unity as shared standard and diversity as the object of individual uses relates to political theories about the relation between individual, society and the state. This presentation uses the work of Viviana Zelizer and André Orléan and Michel Aglietta as exponents of two extremes of this tension. The first one founds money in the diversity and plurality of everyday practices, while the last two found money in a political community. The presentation mobilizes Deleuze's work on the notion of multiplicity, offering an analytics for the debate that focuses on two aspects. The first one concerns the dynamic relation between unification and disaggregation that Deleuze's work offers as an alternative to the foundational tendencies in the analyses of money. The second element concerns the notion of plane of immanence, which addresses hierarchies among constitutive elements as part of the process of aggregation and disaggregation. This view of immanence as set of relations that may shift, disappear and be reconstituted over time problematizes the relations between different forms of immanence. The presentation explores how this conceptualization of multiplicity is useful to address the dynamic, temporal, potentially fragile and always reconstituted relation between everyday monetary practices and the stabilization of money as instituted standard, focusing on how social hierarchies play crucial roles in the process. It is also particularly interesting because it allows for thinking the constitution of monetary practices beyond stately monies and, which is important

	to address the current proliferation of digital monies. This means revisiting critically Deleuze's idea of "societies of control". The presentation ends with an exploration of how the move from a foundational view of money to an analytics of multiplicity provides a reflexive critique on the concept of money itself as a tool to think social relations and hierarchies.
Andrey Orekhov Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, Russia	**"CMW-revolution" and two Stages of Development of Social-Humanitarian Knowledge** There are two fundamental oppositions in interrelations of three types of sciences: natural sciences, social sciences and humanitarian sciences. The first opposition (natural sciences versus social sciences) played a leading role in philosophy of science of the second half of XX century. Else Fritz Machlup in his brilliant work "Are the Social Sciences Really Inferior?" (Machlup F. 'Are the Social Sciences Really Inferior?' // Philosophy of Social Science: Reader. New York. 1963. P.158-180) pointed at nine key points in accordance with a lot of researchers supposed social sciences were inferior in relation with natural science (invariability of observations; verifiability of hypothesis; exactness of findings, etc.). Naturally we should not state "this problem has gone to the past", this problem also exists in present times, but now (in the first third of XXI century) it becomes only (not more than!) a starting-point for reflection on another key opposition "social sciences versus humanitarian sciences". But this opposition became a result of long and difficult process of division in social-humanitarian knowledge, - and central point here was CMW-revolution. T. Kuhn defined "scientific revolution" as the transition from one paradigm to another paradigm. Russian scholar V.Stepin discussed on three stages of development in in social-humanitarian sciences: 1) classical paradigm; 2) not-classical paradigm; 3) post-non-classical paradigm. Therefore, we have here two scientific revolutions: a "not-classical" revolution and a "post-non-classical" revolution. But we do not agree with his opinion. "CMW-revolution" should be decoded as "Comte - Marx - Weber". This revolution really took place approximately 1840 – 1920. What was essence of this revolution? Firstly, August Comte formulated a positivist paradigm; this paradigm became a basis for development of all social sciences in XIX-XX and beginning of XXI centuries. But, for instance, humanitarian sciences (cultural science, philology, literary criticism) have rejected this paradigm, and this became a ground for birth of humanitarian sciences. Secondly, under this revolution social knowledge separate from humanitarian knowledge. At the beginning Neo-Kantianism gave a powerful impulse for this process, and Max Weber finally completed it. And, at last, thirdly, social sciences utterly and finally have got ideological measurement; ideology intersperses in them as integral part, and finally this fact was proved by Karl Marx. "Naturalistic" period in the development of social sciences, - before CMW-

	revolution, - could be characterized as absolute imitation of natural sciences (especially physics) in methodology and theory, indissolubility of social and humanitarian knowledge, absence of ideological measurement in the most of theoretical problems of social knowledge. "Oecumenical" period in the development of social sciences, - after CMW-revolution, - lasts up to contemporary times. This period is characterized with the next features: dissolubility of social and humanitarian knowledge, creation of its own "Universe" ("Oekumena") of social knowledge, different from "Universe" of knowledge of natural science, "idelogization" of any piece of social knowledge. Therefore, it can be concluded, the contemporary stage of the evolution of social-humanitarian knowledge is "evolutional" (or, as stated T.Kuhn, the period of "normal science") and we to present times do not look here the preconditions for a "new scientific revolution".